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TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [IT](#)  
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JUNE 5 MEETING OF G-8 NONPROLIFERATION  
DIRECTORS GROUP (NPDG)

REF: STATE 45019

#### Summary

¶1. (SBU) Acting ISN DAS Matthias Mitman led the U.S. Delegation to the last NPDG meeting before the G-8 Summit. After some heated discussion, the Group agreed on most of the Leaders' nonproliferation statement, but several paragraphs remained in brackets. France remained isolated in opposition to a reference to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Japan insisted on a reference to "abductions" in the North Korea paragraph, and the NPDG agreed that a final draft would need to await a UNSC Resolution. The Syria reference dropped out, as Russia insisted on language rejecting "the unilateral use of force...whatever the pretext," while the Iran paragraph required an uneasy compromise over how strongly to press Tehran. Italy will try to resolve outstanding issues by email. On its other agenda item, the NPDG agreed to a meeting of G-8 1540 experts in September in either Germany or Italy. End Summary

#### Review of Draft Leaders' Statement on Nonproliferation

¶2. (SBU) At the outset, France (Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel), supported by Japan (Toshio Sano), proposed reordering the structure of the statement to put regional issues (Iran, DPRK) near the top, as had been done in 2008. Doing so, they argued, would make clear the importance of those issues. The chair (Italy: Filippo Formica) said he would prefer to keep the order as he had originally set it. No one objected.

¶3. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards: Russia (Anatoly Antonov) wanted to make a distinction between comprehensive safeguards, which it considered obligatory under the NPT, and the voluntary Additional Protocol, but since the NPT does not specifically mention a "Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement," Russia's proposal was not accepted. The U.S. proposal for language on IAEA resources was accepted, but Germany (Claus Wunderlich), France, the UK (Liane Saunders) and Canada (Andre Giroux) objected strongly to "increased" resources, and the word was dropped. Japan said the final text would depend on the outcome of the June 15-16 IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting.

¶4. (SBU) The paragraph on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was agreed without discussion. The Group accepted the addition to the paragraph on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) of a sentence to welcome the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a program of work, which includes negotiation of an FMCT. After France made clear it would not accept reference to a "verifiable" FMCT, the Group accepted the French compromise of an FMCT "including verification provisions," the language that was also used in the EU FMCT statement at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in May.

¶5. (SBU) France continued to reject reference to "a world free of nuclear weapons," which Simon-Michel said was a "strong red line." After Mitman and others insisted on retaining the reference, the Group agreed to put the sentence in brackets and seek resolution later. The Italian Presidency indicated they may raise this issue at the Political Directors level or higher.

¶6. (SBU) The discussion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was largely hung up over a listing of various proposals on fuel banks. Antonov insisted that Russia's international enrichment center at Angarsk be mentioned first because it is already operational. The Chair pressed for listing the fuel bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) first because it is listed first on the IAEA BOG agenda and is a multilateral initiative involving several G-8 members. Formica agreed to redraft the listing when he re-circulated the text; if it could not be agreed, the paragraph would just mention proposals in general, as last year's text had done. (Note: In a revised nonproliferation Leaders' statement circulated by the Italian Presidency on June 10, the Angarsk Center is listed first. End note)

¶7. (U) Language on the consideration by the Nuclear Suppliers Group of the transfer of sensitive technology was left unchanged pending conclusion of the NSG meeting on June 12. If no decision is reached at the NSG, as seems likely, the language will remain unchanged.

¶8. (SBU) Wunderlich objected to the specific mention of biological and chemical safety, security, and related assistance in the references to the BWC work program and the OPCW in the paragraph proposed by the U.S. on the implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, arguing that these were only examples. After some discussion these references were deleted, and what remains is support for progress under the treaties and a call for their full and effective implementation.

¶9. (SBU) The discussion of Iran focused on Antonov's objection to a sentence that "warmly welcome(d)" the new direction of U.S. policy toward Iran, which opened a "window of opportunity" for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Mitman and others, including the British and French, pushed back by stressing that Iran had limited time to pursue a negotiated settlement. Antonov saw this as an implication that the open window would close at some time, implying a threat to use military force. France and others wanted to keep the implication that it was time for Iran to seize the opportunity. In the end the reference to a new U.S. policy was dropped, but the window of opportunity remained. The compromise seemed tenuous, however; it could well come undone between now and the Summit.

¶10. (SBU) As has become traditional in NPDG debates on North Korea, Japan insisted on retaining a reference to "the abduction issue," while others, including the U.S., wanted it deleted on grounds that it was not relevant to nonproliferation. The reference remained in brackets, and the Group understood that the paragraph would have to be revised in any case, based on the outcome of negotiations in New York on a UN Security Council resolution. (Note: The UNSC adopted a resolution on the DPRK on June 12, and the Italian Presidency plans to circulate a new DPRK paragraph on June 15.)

¶11. (SBU) In the discussion of Syria, Russia insisted again on language rejecting "the unilateral use of force...whatever the pretext." Many others (France, the UK, the U.S., Germany, and the Chair) said they could not accept such language, which the Chair said was a subject for the UN Security Council, not the G-8. Recognizing consensus could not be reached, the Italians deleted the paragraph on Syria.

¶12. (SBU) The paragraph on WMD and terrorism included a reference to President Obama's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. Antonov objected, noting it was too soon to welcome and commit to participating in the initiative without more details. The reference to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), proposed by the U.S. and included in this draft by the Chair, was deleted when several representatives objected to the reference to a non-governmental initiative. The reference proposed by the U.S. to continued information exchanges within the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group did not make it into the June 5 Chairman's draft.

¶13. (SBU) Russia insisted in deleting the reference to "related materials" in the Proliferation Security Initiative paragraph because it is not a member of the Australia Group. The paragraph on the Hague Code of Conduct on Preventing Ballistic Missile Proliferation was strengthened by reference to "positive developments" at the recent HCOC annual meeting and an expression of confidence that "all subscribing states will soon fully implement their commitments."

¶14. (U) The Group accepted the paragraph on the Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that had been agreed by the GP Working Group the previous day. (GPWG discussion reported septel.)

¶15. (U) The Chair said he would delete the paragraph on Chernobyl, which Germany and the UK thought duplicated references to Chernobyl in other G-8 documents, but the draft circulated after the meeting still contained that paragraph.

UNSCR 1540

¶15. (U) After a brief discussion, the Chair asked if there was agreement to hold a meeting of G-8 experts on UNSCR 1540, and when no one objected, announced that such agreement existed. He said he would consult with Germany, which was considering whether to host such a meeting, and would have an answer the following week. Mitman subsequently followed up with Wunderlich, and the Germans are close to making a final decision to host a meeting of around 30 experts in September prior to the 1540 Committee's Comprehensive Review.  
CLINTON